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court misquotes Rule 5:25 so that the ends of justice provi-
sion is conspicuously omitted. Whether this omission is
deliberate or subconscious, it clearly reflects the prevailing
attitude on the Supreme Court of Virginia today. When
reviewing the validity of a death sentence, the only end the
court apparently seeks to attain is the dismissal of any and
all claims as quickly and easily as possible.
Theoretically, this persistent pattern of disparate appli-
cation of the contemporaneous objection rule could pro-
vide a basis for a constitutional challenge to Virginia's capi-
tal sentencing scheme. Realistically, however, it is extremely
doubtful that any court would be receptive to such an argu-
ment. No matter how persuasive the evidence, no court is
likely to rule that the seven justices on the Supreme Court
of Virginia are incapable of being objective in capital cases.
VII. Practical Implications
As a result of the Supreme Court of Virginia's current
approach to the application of the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule in capital cases, capital defense attorneys should
make a supreme effort at trial to preserve issues for appeal.
However vehemently and persuasively one may argue that
the approach followed by the Supreme Court of Virginia is
wrong, unfair and unjust, such protestations are of little
help to the client sitting on death row.
Nevertheless, even the most zealous, competent and
conscientious attorneys will occasionally make mistakes.
Therefore, it is important to construct an effective strategy
for raising the ends of justice exception on appeal. Defense
counsel should try to formulate arguments designed to con-
vince the Supreme Court of Virginia to return to the stan-
dard of Cooper v. Commonwealth,13 which would require
the court to apply the exception in cases involving the
deprivation of constitutional rights, as well as claims of
actual innocence."4 This approach is arguably consistent
with the Brown-Campbell-Jiminez"3 line of cases, and is
certainly consistent with the long-standing principal that
capital cases warrant the application of more, rather than
less, procedural protections than noncapital cases.
113205 Va. 883,140 S.E.2d 688 (1965).
"'Campbell, 205 Va. at 892,140 S.E.2d at 694.
"'Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 VaApp. 126, 380 S.E.2d 8
(1989); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 VaApp. 988,421 S.E.2d
652 (1992);Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d
678 (1991).
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"... commit cruelty on a person long enough and the mind begins to go."'
-Sophocles, Antigone
BY: ANDREA L. MOSELEY
I. Introduction
Capital defense attorneys spend an extraordinary
amount of energy, resources and time trying to save the
lives of their clients. While clients and attorneys may dis-
agree on any number of issues, generally it is assumed that
both the capital defendant and his or her attorney share at
least one common goal, avoiding the death penalty.
However, to the contrary, the phenomenon of the capital
defendant electing execution is not uncommon.2 In consid-
ering the current legal and ethical responsibilities of capital
defense attorneys, it is important to be informed about
'Ismene: But look, we're both guilty, both condemned to
death. Antigone: [No, Justice will never suffer that ... ] Courage!
Live your life. I gave myself to death long ago ... Creon:They're
both mad ... Ismene:True my King, the sense we're born with can-
not last forever ... commit cruelty on a person long enough and
the mind begins to go. Sophocles, Antigone, (Robert Fagles trans.,
Penguin, 1984).
'Welsh S.White, Defendant's Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 853,854 (1987).
what to do when your client elects execution over repre-
sentation.
Five of the first eight people executed after the rein-
statement of capital punishment resisted some part of their
defense.3 Defendants' reasons for wanting to abandon their
case and receive a speedy execution include wanting to
avoid the physical conditions of death row,4 bravado,5 and
the desire to spare his or her family from further agony.
6
Perhaps the most notable voluntary execution case was
Gilmore v. Utah.7 Gilmore killed and robbed a service sta-
tion attendant and a motel night clerk in July 1976.8 On
3G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency,
Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74
J. CRiM. L. & CIjiNOLOGY 860,861 (1983).
'Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices forAttorneys Whose
Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEo.J. LEGAL ETmCS 799,801 n.16 (1990).
'See White, supra note 2,at 872, referring to, Gilmore v. Utah,
429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
6See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243,253,257 S.E.2d
797,804 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
7429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
'White, supra note 2, at 853 n.2, citing, Goldman,Death Wish,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1976, at 26.
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October 7,1976, Gilmore was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death by a jury in a Utah court.9 After his sentence
of death was handed down, Gilmore expressed that he was
willing to accept the death penalty and he resisted both his
mother's"0 and his attorney's efforts to oppose his sen-
tence." Gilmore fired his attorneys for appealing his case
and he hired attorneys to resist his mother's attempt to
intervene on his behalf.12 In a 5-4 decision the Supreme
Court rejected Bessie Gilmore's application for a stay and
Gary Gilmore became the first person to be executed in the
United States in almost ten years.13 Only three and one-half
months after his conviction, Gilmore was shot by a firing
squad on January 17, 1977.11
The second volunteer to be executed was Jesse
Bishop. 5 Bishop resisted a defense even earlier than
Gilmore. Bishop represented himself at trial, refused
court-appointed standby counsel to introduce mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase, and resisted all other
defense efforts.' 6 Steven Judy was third in line to volunteer
for execution.17 Judy was so interested in his own execu-
tion that he instructed his attorneys not to present miti-
gating evidence or argue against the death penalty. He tes-
tified to the jury that he might kill in the future and that
some of his victims might be members of the jury.8
Needless to say, dealing with a client who wishes to waive
appeals and face execution or a client who wishes to plead
guilty to capital murder without an agreement that guarantees
a life sentence, creates a difficult moral and legal quandary for
capital defense counsel.The legal aspects of this dilemma are
painfully clear. If a defendant "volunteers" for execution, the
judicial system will accommodate the capital defendant in his
or her desires.19 Therefore, it is imperative that defense attor-
neys are aware of the laws which permit counsel to resist or
withdraw from representation of a client who will not oppose
his or her own death sentence. The remainder of this article
will discuss areas of law which can help defense attorneys
counsel a defendant who wants to die.
9Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1012-13.
"0On December 2, 1976, Bessie Gilmore filed with the
Supreme Court of the United States for a stay of execution as"next
friend" on behalf of her son, who was scheduled to be executed
on December 6,1976. Since only a limited record was before then
before the Court, a temporary stay of execution was granted on
December 3, 1976. The Court held that Gary Mark Gilmore had
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights
he might have asserted after Utah's trial courts had imposed sen-
tence and accordingly, the stay of execution was terminated on
December 13, 1976. Id. at 1013-1014.
"White, supra note 2, at 854.
2Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1014.
'3Wbite, supra note 2, at 853-54.
4Dieter, supra note 4, at 802 n.23.
"Dieter, supra note 4, at 802 n.25.
161d. at 802 n.25.
111d. at 803 n. 26.
'-Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 151, 416 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind.
1981). See also, White, supra note 2, at 853-54.
19See discussion infra III(C).
H. Basic Background of Capital Punishment:
Society's Interest
The constitutional background of the death penalty
demonstrates that the adversarial system was intentional-
ly chosen to protect the societal interest in a non-arbi-
trary application of the death penalty. In 1972, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty, as it
was being imposed at that time, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.20 In nine
separate opinions, the majority view was that death
penalty laws allowed the administration of death to be
arbitrary and capricious.2' In 1976, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of revised death penalty
statutes.2 2 The Court upheld new death penalty laws as
long as the states provided procedures that reasonably
assured that those selected for the death penalty would
be those whose crime and past history contained aggra-
vating circumstances which would serve to distinguish
them from those not given the death penalty.
23
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that pun-
ishment by death is different from all other punish-
ments. 24 One important difference is that there are
many competing state interests in addition to the indi-
vidual's interests in autonomy, privacy, and dignity
including: avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment,
the preservation of life, and the prevention of suicide.
2
Society certainly has an interest in assuring that death
sentences are not imposed arbitrarily, especially in light
of the Court's concerns in Furman v. Georgia.
26
Society's ability to parse out the most heinous murder-
ers for execution is necessarily thwarted if defendants
are allowed to select death over life imprisonment on
their own terms. The major problem with voluntary
executions is that both the defendant and the prosecu-
tion are seeking the same goal, namely death of the
defendant.Absent an adversarial process, innocent peo-
ple will likely be executed,27 and this is contrary to soci-
ety's interest in using the death penalty for the most
heinous murderers. In order to avoid this result, it is
helpful to examine the different stages at which a capi-
tal defendant may choose certain death at the hands of
the state over representation.
"Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21Dieter, supra note 4, at 803 n.31.
22See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);Jurek v.Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
2 Dieter, supra note 4, at 803 n.33.
24See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens,J.J.:"There is no question that death as a pun-
ishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability").
25Dieter, supra note 4, at 818 n.137-39.
26408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2'Dieter, supra note 4, at 818.
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H. How Can I Legally Keep My Client From
Volunteering to Die?
A. Pre-Trial
An attorney may become aware of the likelihood
that a client will choose the death penalty over life
imprisonment long before the client expresses this sen-
timent in words. It is important for the attorney to look
for these signs and attempt to identify these tendencies
as soon as possible. One way to deter a defendant from
choosing death is to develop a good rapport with the
defendant. This rapport may prevent future conflicts
between attorneys and clients who want to die. 28 The
difficult question to answer is what to do when the con-
flict does arise. The following sections will offer some
advice on how to proceed if a conflict between the
attorney and the client arises.
1. Ethical Considerations
Defense attorneys who have chosen to represent
capital defendants in part because of their opposition to
the death penalty face particularly perplexing ethical
problems when the client wants to die. During the rep-
resentation of this client, counsel may have to choose
between his or her own personal beliefs and the obliga-
tion to pursue what the client wants. Many different pro-
fessional responsibility authorities offer some guidance
for resolving these ethical dilemmas.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has adopted the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility with some modifications. 29 Overall, the attor-
ney's ethical obligations, regarding what to do if your client
wants to be executed, are still very unclear. 0 However, it is
known that counsel's duty to his or her client is very broad
in nature." In general, Canon 7 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia directs counsel to zealously represent his
White, supra note 2, at 856-58. In White's research on defense
attorneys attitudes toward this issue, he reports that they are generally
able to change the defendant's mind in the course of their representa-
tion by developing a close relationship with their clients.This kind of
working relationship not only causes the defendant to "listen to the
attorney's advice.. " but the defendant "... may be loath to take any
action that will eliminate his relationship with the attorney!'Id at 857.
19See Henderson,"Presenting MitgationAgainst the Client'sWishes:
A Moral or Professional Imperative?; Cap. Def.J.,VoL 6, No. 1, p. 35.
wWhite, supra note 2, at 856.
3tSee Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-3
(Michie 1997),"Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action
of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or
adviser.A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and
adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting a
position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals
with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds them. By
contrast, a lawyer serving as advisor primarily assists his client in
determining the course of future conduct and relationships.While
or her client within the bounds of the law and DR 7-101,
further directs that:
DR 7-107. Representing a Client Zealously.-
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means
permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules,
except as provided by 7-101(3)
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer
may:
(1) With the express or implied consent
32
of his client, exercise his professional judg-
ment to limit or vary his client's objectives
and waive or fail to assert a right or a position
of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct
or pursue an objective which he believes to
be unlawful or which is repugnant or impru-
dent and, if the clients insists, withdraw pur-
suant to the provisions of DR 2-108.
Although criminal defense attorneys must show a
great deal of respect for the client's autonomy, an attor-
ney is not "required to slavishly follow all the beliefs and
goals of her client"33 The Ethical Considerations of the
Model Code state more specifically the lawyer's obliga-
tion to carry out the client's objectives. Model Code EC
7-8 provides that "the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forgo legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ulti-
mately for the client and not for himself." Even though
this rule provides for the decision of non-legal factors to
be for the client, the Model Code does not specifically
allocate the decision to oppose the death penalty as a
decision over which the defendant has control.
serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve favor of his clients
doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving as adviser, a
lawyer in appropriate circumstances should give his profes-
sional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts
would likely be as to the applicable law: See John R. Mitchell,
Comment, Attorneys Representing Death Row Clients: Client
Autonomy Over Personal Opinions, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 643,645
n.7 (1996), citing, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 7-5 (1981); and Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166
(1985).
32"The Virginia Code gives no guidance as to the meaning of
'implied authority'.:Without guidance on this language, defense
counsel could argue that the totality of the circumstances based
on counsel's observations of the defendant may be used to
invoke the '"implied authority" exception. Henderson, supra
note 27, at 35. Defense counsel can argue that the mere fact that
the defendant has not fired him leads counsel to believe that he
or she has the implied authority to act as defense counsel, i.e.
resist the state's charges.
33Dieter, supra note 4, at 811.
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The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice offer another perspective on where the control and
direction of the criminal case should rest.m
Standard 4-5.2. Control and Direction of the
Case
(A) Certain decisions relating to the conduct
of the case are ultimately for the accused
and others are ultimately for defense coun-
sel. The decisions which are to be made by
the accused after full consultation with
counsel include:
(1) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;
(iii) whether to waive jury trial;
(iv) whether to testify in his or her own
behalf;
(v) whether to appeal.
(B) Strategic and tactical decisions should
be made by defense counsel after consulta-
tion with the client where feasible and
appropriate. Such decisions include what
witnesses to call, whether and how to con-
duct cross-examination, what jurors to
accept or strike, what trial motions should
be made, and what evidence should be
introduced.
During pre-trial litigation, the first conflict between
the client who wants to die and defense counsel may be
over whether or not to accept a plea offer for life. Pre-trial
negotiations may ultimately determine whether the defen-
dant lives or dies and failure to respond or act on plea bar-
gains may result in a hasty withdrawal of the offer. The
question becomes: Can the defense attorney negotiate a
life sentence when his or her client wants to plead guilty
to the death penalty without a written agreement to life in
prison? In light of the aforementioned rules and standards,
defense attorneys must continually negotiate with the
prosecution for a life sentence even if the client wants to
plead guilty.Although the Model Code gives the client the
responsibility for the objectives of the litigation and the
Standards for Criminal Justice give the client ultimate
authority over whether to accept plea agreements, initiat-
ing and negotiating with the prosecutor are not the same
as deciding to take an offer.The lawyer's role during this
stage of pre-trial litigation is to keep the defendant
informed about all of his or her legal options.15 Criminal
Justice Standards do not require the client's consent
before entering into negotiations with the prosecutor in a
capital case.36 However, clearly, the ultimate decision to
accept a pleas rests with the client.
Finally, an attorney should never forgo reminding the
.4See the Virginia corollary in the Rules of Supreme Court of
Virginia Pt. 6, § II, EC 7-7 (Michie 1997).
-5Dieter, supra note 4, at 805.
6Dieter, supra note 4, at 805 n.45.
client that a plea-bargain for life is a way to avoid a lengthy
and degrading trial. A defense attorney in Pennsylvania
3 7
reported that nearly every client that he has represented
has, at some point, expressed a desire not to oppose the
death penalty. The same attorney further explained that
clients are most adamant about this before trial and before
he has had the opportunity to establish a relationship with
the client.The client's opposition to life in prison inevitably
interferes with the critical stages of plea bargaining.
Nonetheless, the attorney must continue to negotiate with
the prosecution for a life sentence even when the client is
leaning toward pleading guilty to the death penalty. In any
case, defense counsel has a continuing obligation to advise
against pleading guilty in capital cases without obtaining an
agreement in writing for a non-capital disposition, other-
wise, the defense may be agreeing to execution.8
Although the defendant's understanding of a plea will
be reviewed by the court, defense counsel should intervene
if he or she believes that there are reasonable grounds for
doubting the competency of the client. In certain circum-
stances an attorney's duty to follow instructions of the
client can be relaxed.The Model Code states that "any men-
tal or physical condition of a client that renders him inca-
pable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf
casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer ... [who]
may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions
on behalf of the cient." 9The client is given ultimate author-
ity over the decision to plea and the overall direction of the
litigation, however, the client may not be competent to
make those decisions. The ethical guidelines of the Model
Code recognize that an attorney may assume greater
responsibility when a client's mental capabilities are
impaired. In the Virginia Code, EC 7-11 and 7-12 are rele-
vant:
EC 7-11.-The responsibilities of a lawyer may
vary according to the intelligence, experi-
ence, mental condition or age of a client, the
obligation of a public officer, or the nature of
a particular proceeding. Examples include
the representation of an illiterate or an
incompetent...
EC 7-12.-Any mental or physical condition of
a client that renders him incapable of making
a considered judgment on his own behalf
casts additional responsibilities upon the
lawyer ...
37White, supra note 2, at 859-60.
"There are manyVirginia cases where guilty pleas have result-
ed in death sentences, see Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260,
435 S.E.2d 636 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 (1994);
Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656 (1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 959 (1992); Savino v. Commonwealth, 239
Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990);
Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d (1989), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).
"Dieter, supra note 4, at 806 n.49.
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Each of these sections indicates that there is, in fact,
a point at which defense attorneys are ethically obligat-
ed to assess his or her client's competency to forgo plea
agreements for a life sentence.The issue of competency
will be discussed more fully in the section entitled
"Appeals".
B. Penalty Phase
The central problem that defense counsel may
encounter in the penalty phase is the defendant's refusal
to allow counsel to present mitigating evidence."0 The
penalty phase of capital trial is unique and quite distinct
from most areas of criminal law. The first statutes that
were upheld by the Supreme Court provided for sepa-
rate guilt and sentencing proceedings which allow the
sentencer to make individualized determinations about
who should get death.4 In 1978, the Supreme Court held
that the nature of mitigating evidence in the penalty
phase of a capital trial could not be limited.42 Yet, the
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on whether miti-
gation evidence is essential to a capital trial and whether
a defendant may choose to withhold all mitigating evi-
dence from a sentencer."
Although there is neither the statutory nor constitu-
tional requirement for defense counsel to present miti-
gating evidence in the capital trial, the United States
Supreme Court has continually emphasized the impor-
tance of mitigation in a system which permits the death
penalty.4 Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Lenhard v.
Wolff,' makes a compelling argument that mitigation evi-
dence is a procedural requirement before imposing the
death penalty.
4 6
This Court's toleration of the death penalty
has depended on its assumption that the
penalty will be imposed only after a painstak-
ing review of aggravating and mitigating fac-
"'There are several Virginia Cases in which capital defen-
dant's have opposed presentation of mitigation. See e.g., Dubois,
246 Va. 260; Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d
48 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1943); Chabrol v.
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 427 S.E.2d 374 (1993); Davidson,
244Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656.
4 It is important to note that when the Texas and Florida
statutes were approved, the Supreme Court also struck down
mandatory death sentences. Dieter, supra note 4, at 806 n.53.
2Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Lockett was specifical-
ly reaffirmed in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
"See Henderson, supra note 27, at 35 n. 11-12, citing, Laura
A. Rosenwald, Death Wish: What Washington Courts Should
Do When a Capital Defendant Wants To Die, 68 WASH. L.REv.
735 (1993).
"Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976).
"444 U.S. 807, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1301 (1979).
'1d. at 813-14.
tors. In this case, that assumption has proved
demonstrably false. Instead, the Court has
permitted the State's mechanism of execu-
tion to be triggered by an entirely arbitrary
factor: the defendant's decision to acquiesce
in his own death. In my view, the procedure
the Court approves today amounts to nothing
less than state-administered suicide.
4 7
Both Justice Marshall's argument in Lenhard and the
Supreme Court's basic pronouncement that "the penalty of
death is qualitatively different ... Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appro-
priate punishment in a specific case,4" present a strong
argument that the presentation of mitigating evidence is
constitutionally required.These approaches lend weight to
the argument that the penalty phase cannot go forward
unless mitigating evidence is presented. Therefore, if the
attorney is concerned that offering mitigating evidence
would violate the duty to abide by the client's instructions,
he or she has a legal basis for doing so.P9 The Model Code
requires that attorneys must be "within the bounds of the
law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of the law."0 With this in
mind, the attorney can justifiably argue that mitigating evi-
dence is constitutionally required and cannot be waived by
the defendant."
In addition to the suggested constitutional arguments
for the presentation of mitigation, there are a number of
standards of professional responsibility which may also
assist defense counsel.These sections include Virginia Code
of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, DR 7-101, EC 7-7, EC
7-11 and EC 7-12;12 American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, 4-4.1, 4-4.52, 4-8.1 and 18-6.3;" American
Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 11.4.1,
11.8.1, 11.8.2, 11.8.3 and 11.8.6.51
471d. at 814.
4 8Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
"Dieter, supra note 4, at 807.
"Dieter, supra note 4, at 807 n.57. MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4.
5'id. at 807. For treatment of this particular argument in other
jurisdictions see People v Deere, 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985) (attor-
ney who acquiesced to his client's request not to present mitigat-
ing evidence failed to effectively represent the client); People v.
Bloom, 782 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989) (defendant acting pro se could
not claim ineffective assistance of counsel when his own mitigat-
ing evidence was not presented); People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627
(Cal. 1989) (although some mitigating evidence was presented, the
court rejected defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective
for failing to present mitigating evidence over his objections).
"These sections pertain to zealous representation of the
client and the client's autonomy in making certain decisions.
"These sections pertain to the duty to investigate and the
control and direction of the case.
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C. Appeals
The length and complexity of death penalty appeals,
along with numerous stages of rejection can cause the
client to be hopeless." Many different psychological fac-
tors6 can contribute to the defendant's desire to waive
appeals and avoid life imprisonment by yielding to the
state's power to execute. While the decision to appeal is
explicitly reserved to the client under the ABA Standards of
Criminal Justice 4-5.2 (v), what does defense counsel do if
the client wants to waive appeals after a sentence of death
has been handed down? The following section will offer
some alternatives and possibilities for defense counsel fac-
ing this dilemma.
1. "Next Friend" Arguments
If the client wants to forgo appeals after being advised
not to, then it may be necessary to question whether or not
the defendant has the capacity to understand the choice
between life and death. As it was stated earlier, if a defen-
dant "volunteers" for execution, the judicial system will
accommodate the capital defendant in his or her desires.
This fact is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Whitmore v. Arkansas.7 In Whitmore,
Ronald Simmons was sentenced to death for multiple homi-
cides by an Arkansas court. After his conviction, Simmons
requested permission to waive appeals and to receive the
death penalty as soon as possible. Arkansas has no rule
requiring mandatory direct appeal of capital convictions
and subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the
defendant's request to die.
In order to continue appeals without the support of the
defendant it may be necessary to intervene as "next friend"
on his or her behalf. Whitmore was fundamental in explain-
ing the different methods for intervening on behalf of a
defendant. Whitmore attempted to intervene on behalf of
Ronald Simmons with a two-part argument. SinceWhitmore
was also sentenced to death, he claimed both a direct inter-
est in the outcome and "next friend" status to assert the
claims of Simmons. As to Whitmore's claim of direct inter-
est, the Supreme Court held that Whitmore lacked standing
to invoke federal jurisdiction of the court. The portion of
the Whitmore case which may assist defense attorneys is
the "next friend" issue. On the "next friend" claim advanced
byWhitmore, the Court held that he did not meetArkansas'
two-part standard which requires the "next friend" to: (1)
provide adequate explanation as to why the real party in
interest cannot appear; and (2) be "truly dedicated to the
best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to lit-
5'Each of these sections is explored in depth on the issue of
mitigation in: Henderson, supra note 27, at 32.
"Dieter, supra note 4, at 811 n. 87.
"See White, supra note 2 at 871-875.
57495 U.S. 149 (1990).
igate."5 The Court held that Whitmore did not meet either
of these standards and upheld Simmons' request to be exe-
cuted. In the Court's opinion, Simmons had passed a psy-
chiatric examination with regard to his decision to volun-
tarily be executed and was competent.
The holding in Whitmore allowed the Supreme Court to
avoid deciding whether the Constitution requires mandato-
ry review of capital cases. Virginia law is different than
Arkansas law in thatVirginia does have a statutory provision
which requires the Virginia Supreme Court to "review" all
capital cases and sentences." While, the language in the
statute is not "appeal, the word "review" has been inter-
preted to require review in all capital cases.' The Supreme
Court of Virginia has held that a capital defendant is pro-
hibited from waiving mandatory review of the death sen-
tence.61 As a matter of policy, the legislature enacted a
statute which requires unwaivable review of death sen-
tences.This is indicative of the existence of a public policy
which suggests that the death penalty deserves review not
otherwise required in criminal cases. Furthermore, when a
client waives the stages of trial which put the defendant's
individual circumstances on the record, mandatory review
policy is thwarted. After all, if there are no individualized
determinations put on the record, then nothing is left to
review and the statute loses meaning.
As defense attorneys who do not want their clients to
die, it is possible to intervene as a "next friend" in Virginia.
Virginia's "next friend" standard does not require the next
friend to obtain consent of the person for whom he or she
seeks to intervene.62 Virginia death penalty law is also dif-
ferent than Arkansas in that the Virginia Code only requires
that the "next friend" diligently press the cause once he or
she takes it, and does not make threshold demands on who
can enter as "next friend" on the litigant's behalf.6 13 In
Whitmore, the Court noted that despite Simmons' desire to
waive appeal, his attorney still appeared before the court
and outlined the issues that were open for appeal." In light
of this, it can still be argued that the attorney with a client
like Simmons, must still research and argue the issues for
appeal in spite of the defendant's desire to be executed.
One good reason for counsel's continued representation
is that the defendant may ultimately change his or her mind
about whether to appeal.An example of this can be found
in Savino v. Commonwealth.65 In Savino, the defendant
pled guilty and then volunteered for execution. However,
Savino ultimately changed his mind and decided to go for-
"Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161-65.
59Va. CodeAnn. §17-110.1 (Michie 1990).
'Briley v. Bass, 584 ESupp. 807 (E.D.Va. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 893 (1984).
6 Davidson, 244 Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656.
62Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28 S.E.2d 40 (1943); Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-8 (Michie 1990).
"Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-8 (Michie 1990).
"Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 153.
65239 Va. 534,391 S.E.2d 276 (1990).
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ward with the appeals process. In response, the Virginia
Supreme Court refused to recognize Savino's constitutional
challenges because the defendant knowingly and voluntari-
ly pled guilty to the charges and waived his right to trial on
them.6 This case alone illustrates the gravity of the prob-
lems that can be created by a defendant who, at some point
in the process, will not oppose execution but then changes
his or her mind.The legal consequences of a defendant who
vacillates between life and death can be monumental and in
many cases, irreversible.
2. Competency to Waive Appeals
Although the next friend arguments are available, argu-
ing that the defendant is incompetent to waive appeals may
prove more successful. The reason for this largely stems
from an analysis of Gilmore v. Utah. In Gilmore, Justice
White wrote in his dissent that "the consent of a criminal
defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to
impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."67 The Court attempted to sidestep this ques-
tion.0' Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion wrote
in reference to Justice White's point,
[w]hatever may be said to the merits of this
suggestion, the question is simply not before
us. Gilmore, duly found to be competent by
Utah courts, has had available meaningful
access to this Court and has declined express-
ly to assert any claim here other than his
explicit repudiation of Bessie Gilmore's effort
to speak for him as next friend.69
The position that"the question is simply not before us"
suggests that the Supreme Court could not decide whether
or not Gilmore should be permitted to waive state appellate
review. This, in turn, illustrates that as far as the United
States Supreme Court is concerned, no one has standing to
appeal for the defendant who waives state appellate review
as long as the defendant is competent."0
The Gilmore decision suggests that a hearing to evalu-
ate a defendant's competency will not be available unless
evidence, besides the fact that the defendant wants to die,
indicates incompetency. In other words, an additional hear-
ing on competency will not necessarily be available simply
because the defendant expresses the desire to accept exe-
cution. If this analysis is correct, then the next issue of
importance is how to make a showing of incompetency.
An important case to consult in order to understand
the standard for incompetency is Rees v. Peyton.7 ' In Rees,
66Id. at 538-39, 391 S.E.2d at 278. Savino was found to have
waived all defenses except a jurisdictional challenge.
'Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1018.
White, supra note 2, at 861.
"Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1017.
"'White, supra note 2, at 861.
7'384 U.S. 312 (1966).
the standard that the Supreme Court set out for determin-
ing competency of a capital defendant to waive his rights is
"roughly equivalent" to the standard used to determine
competency to stand trial.72 Thus, the defendant will be
deemed competent unless the defendant lacks sufficient
"capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational
choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further lit-
igation."73 In other words, capital defendants will be held
competent to waive their rights as long as it seems that they
can sufficiently understand the choice that confronts them.
The similarity between the standard for competency to
stand trial and the test for whether to allow the execution
of a defendant seems counterintuitive since the two situa-
tions have such gravely different consequences. In deter-
mining the competency to stand trial the court determines
whether the defendant understands the charges and has the
capacity to communicate with the attorney in an effective
manner. On the other hand, the competency decision that
must be made when deciding whether to let a capital defen-
dant elect execution concerns the capacity to choose
between life or death.74 A defendant may be perfectly able
to understand the charges and to cooperate with counsel
and still be completely emotionally unable to make a life or
death decision. Given the gravity and irrevocability of
death, it seems that the standard for competency should be
much higher for the defendant who elects death.
7 5
The idea that the defendant should have to meet a
higher competency standard before electing death, raises
concerns about usurping the defendant's autonomy. One
of the major reasons that the defendant's autonomy may
have to be usurped is the fact that defendants do change
their minds about whether they want to die. Defendants
like Savino may change their minds late in the process
and find that they have lost issues for appeal due to a pre-
vious but mistaken desire to die. It is this kind of mistak-
en desire that our system of capital punishment cannot
make itself vulnerable to in an effort to respect the auton-
omy of the defendant.
Although the argument for more defendant autonomy
is legitimate and carries a great deal of legal foundation, the
defendant's autonomy is not the only interest hanging in
the balance. It is imperative to remember that the state has
no interest in illegally executing citizens. Allowing defen-
dants to choose certain death does not adequately protect
society from a system which imposes death on its citizens
without exploring the individuality of every defendant
charged with capital murder.
7'White, supra note 2, at 863.
'1Rees, 384 U.S. 312,314.
74White, supra note 2, at 867.
71Many different authorities have suggested this as an alterna-
tive to Rees v.Peyton: see Franz v.Arkansas, 296Ark. 181,188,754
S.W.2d 839, 843 (1988), involving the same defendant in
Whitmore; White, supra note 2 at 867-868 n.57.
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VI. Conclusion
The circumstances surrounding a client's election of
execution is certainly complex and troubling for both the
defendant and the attorney who is trying to present a case
on his or her behalf. Consider the following statement that
was made in Lenhard v. Woff. "Bishop [the defendant] is an
individual who, for reasons I can fathom only slightly, has
chosen to forego his federal remedies. Assuming his com-
petence ... he should be free to choose. To deny him that
would be to incarcerate his spirit-the one thing that remains
free and which the state need not and should not
imprison."76 The very suggestion that "we", as a society,
should preserve a defendant's "spirit" by allowing him or
her to die at the hands of the state is deeply troubling.This
type of suggestion highlighting a move away from protect-
ing society's interest in non-arbitrary application of the
death penalty must be resisted. Several areas of the law per-
mit, if not demand, defense attorneys to persist in represen-
tation throughout a capital trial. Each stage of death penal-
ty litigation carries with it ethical considerations which pre-
sent defense attorneys with the difficult dilemma of choos-
ing between a client's desire to die and the attorney's per-
sonal and legal beliefs. It is valid to argue that the decision
to die is not specifically allocated to the defendant and
6Mitchell, supra note 29 at 670, n.204, citing Lenhard v. Wolff,
603 E2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1979) (Sneed,J., concurring).
therefore, counsel has an ethical obligation to pursue legal-
ly available channels in opposition to death. Admittedly,
the ultimate decision to plea, to appeal, or to fire the attor-
ney rests with the client. However, short of a definitive,
explicit decision, the attorney should proceed and preserve
the issues that may save the life of the defendant.
Even when the defendant does explicitly waive his or
her rights in a capital case, it is important for counsel to
continually assess the defendant's competency level. Due
to the finality and severity of a decision to die, the defense
attorney may have an obligation to question and ask for a
hearing to determine the defendant's current level of
competency. Finally, it is essential that the defense attor-
ney remind the court in any argument that he or she
makes that "death is different" and there is much more
than the defendant's preference at stake. Society, as a
whole, including those who will face the death penalty in
the future, has an interest in the non-arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty. Once a defendant knows that he or
she may face death, many psychological factors play into
the decision to die. Some even suggest that defendants
intentionally used the death penalty to complete a suicide
that he or she is unable to do alone." When these kinds of
virtually unknowable mental issues are at stake, it is best
to err on the side of process.
",White, supra note 2, at 874.
VIRGINIA'S "21 DAY RULE" AND ILLINOIS' DEATH ROW DEBACLE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CAPITAL JUSTICE
AND THE RELEVANCE OF INNOCENCE
BY: ANNE E. DUPREY
I. The 21 Day Rule
A. Its Contours
In Virginia, compelling evidence of the innocence of a
death row inmate usually generates a newspaper headline,
but it virtually never results in a court's consideration of the
evidence or exoneration and release of the inmate. Under
Rule 1.1 of the Supreme Court of Virginia (hereinafter"the
21 Day rule"), the Commonwealth grants capital defendants
who have been sentenced to death a period of only 21 days
from the date of the entry of final judgment to present new
evidence, including evidence of innocence.' This Rule pro-
'Rule 1.1 of the Supreme Court of Virginia, commonly
referred to as the "21 Day Rule," is entitled,"Finality of Judgments,
Orders and Decrees7 This Rule provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a]UI final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of
court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject
to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after
the date of entry, and no longer:'The Rule applies to civil and crim-
inal cases, alike, and makes no special provision for capital cases.
scribes the courts' consideration of newly discovered
evidence, which includes evidence borne of the appli-
cation of new forensic testing methods (such as DNA
analysis) to previously considered evidence. Under this
Rule, evidence that was wrongfully and unlawfully sup-
pressed by the prosecution constitutes "new evi-
dence."2 The Rule applies regardless of the magnitude
or potential import of a particular piece of evidence. In
essence, once the initial 21 day period has passed, the
existence of definitive, unassailable evidence of a death
row inmate's innocence is trumped by the premium
that Virginia has placed upon the finality of its judg-
ments. In Virginia, clear and persuasive evidence of a
death row inmate's innocence does not merit an evi-
dentiary hearing or a new trial. Instead, the 21 Day Rule
'Joe Jackson & June Arney, Sentenced to Die Without Fair
Trials Series: Dead End on Death Row?, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR, June 26, 1994, at 2, available in 1994 WL
6610599.
